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Abstract. My aim in this paper is to critically assess two opposing theses about the epis-
temology of religious belief. The first one, developed by John Mackie, claims that belief 
in God can be justified or warranted only if there is a good argument for the existence 
of God. The second thesis, elaborated by Alvin Plantinga, holds that even if there is no 
such argument, belief in God can be justified or warranted. I contend that the first thesis 
is plausibly false, because belief in God is not just like a scientific hypothesis, and the 
second thesis is likely true if epistemic externalism is the correct view. However, even if 
the second thesis is true, I argue that to work on good arguments for God’s existence is 
unavoidable in order to cope with a new version of the Great Pumpkin objection, as well 
as to achieve other relevant purposes such as to convince rational observers outside 
the theistic community that belief in God is likely justified or warranted.
Keywords: epistemology of religious belief; warrant; theistic belief; natural theology; 
mackie; plantinga.
Introduction
It seems that most people accept some form of theism (cf. The World Fact-
book 2013–14, CIA). “Theism” or “theistic belief” is the belief that there 
is a God, as conceived of in the central tradition of the main monotheistic 
religions (Judaism, Christianity, and Islam), in which God is seen as a per-
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sonal, omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent being, etc. But why do 
these people accept that belief? How can they be justified or warranted 
in believing that there is a theistic God? By “justification” or “warrant” 
I mean the property that distinguishes knowledge from mere true belief.1 
In other words, it is that quality or quantity which, in due measure and to-
gether with truth and belief, is sufficient for knowledge. So, we need to ask: 
Is theistic belief justified or warranted for those people who believe in God?
At first glance we may be inclined to assert that they are justified or 
warranted in those beliefs only if they have a successful theistic argument, 
i.e., a good (noncircular) argument that proves that God exists. For that 
purpose, there have been some attempts, like the ontological argument, 
the cosmological argument, the teleological argument, etc. However, those 
people who believe in God do not usually resort to proofs or arguments for 
justifying their theistic belief. Certainly most of them have not even heard 
of these theistic arguments. Instead it seems that they believe in God in 
a basic way and in circumstances of religious experience. Here, by speaking 
of “religious experience” I mean to focus on common or everyday experi-
ences of faith rather than extraordinary experiences (such as the witnessing 
of miracles or mystical experiences). More precisely, I mean experiences of 
praying, reading the Bible, attending Mass, feeling guilt or gratitude, facing 
danger, or simply contemplating the beauty of nature, and so on, in which 
one may be said to sense God’s presence or something of the sort.
Now the problem I want to pose is the following: Can theistic belief be 
justified or warranted (by way of religious experience) without a successful 
theistic argument? This amounts to asking whether theistic belief can be 
properly basic. By “basic belief” I mean the following: a belief p at time t is 
basic for a person S iff p at t is such that it is accepted by S but not on the 
basis of any argument; in other words, p at t is such that it is not arrived at 
by way of any inferences from S’s other beliefs. And by “properly basic be-
lief” I mean the following: a belief p at time t is properly basic for a person 
1 Plantinga (1993a, 4–5) prefers to use the term “warrant” instead of “justification” 
as a name for such a property, because the term “justification” seems to suggest 
a deontological affair while “warrant” is more neutral. However, here I am using 
“warrant” and “justification” as synonymous.
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S iff (i) p is a basic belief at t for S and (ii) p has justification or warrant at t 
for S.2 So, our problem is to survey whether theistic belief can be properly 
basic in circumstances of religious experiences. There are at least two the-
ses in dispute to answer this problem, namely:
(T) It is necessary that if theistic belief has warrant (for example, by way of 
religious experience), then there is a successful theistic argument.
(~T) It is possible that theistic belief has warrant (for example, by way of reli-
gious experience) even if there isn’t any successful theistic argument.
The first thesis (T) expresses that theistic belief can get no warrant unless 
there is a good theistic argument, whereas the second thesis (~T) asserts 
that even if there are no such good theistic arguments, theistic belief can 
be warranted. More rigorously and in logical notation, where “W” stands 




My aim in this paper is to show that (i) if epistemic externalism is true, 
thesis (~T) is plausible; but, (ii) even if (~T) is true, it is necessary to have 
good theistic arguments for some purposes, namely to cope with a new 
version of the Great Pumpkin objection and to convince rational observ-
ers outside the theistic community that belief in God is likely justified or 
warranted. In order to accomplish this goal, I draw on the following plan: 
in §1 I present and criticize John Mackie’s argument for (T); in §2 I review 
Alvin Plantinga’s argument for (~T);3 and finally in §3 I argue for the role 
that theistic arguments play even if thesis (~T) is true.
2 Here I am following Plantinga’s definition of basicity (cf. 1993a, 70; 2000, 178; 2015, 36).
3 In this paper I present the argumentation of Mackie and Plantinga because they 
illustrate very well the theses in dispute, (T) and (~T). But we could present similar 
arguments for such theses. For example, Martin (1990), Sobel (2003), Oppy (2009), 
and Draper (2013) seem to argue for thesis (T), whereas Wolterstorff (1988), Alston 
(1991), S. Evans (2011), and Bergmann (2012) seem to argue for thesis (~T).
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1. Mackie’s argument for (T)
In order to present Mackie’s argument it is worth reading some quotes. In 
Mackie’s book The Miracle of Theism (1983) we find the following:
(Q1) “If it is agreed that the central assertions of theism are literally mean-
ingful, it must also be admitted that they are not directly verified or directly 
verifiable. It follows that any rational consideration of whether they are true 
or not will involve arguments. [...] It [whether God exists] must be examined 
either by deductive or inductive reasoning or, if that yields no decision, by 
arguments to the best explanation; for in such a context nothing else can have 
any coherent bearing on the issue” (1983, 4, 6).
(Q2) “If the religious experiences do not yield any argument for a further super-
natural reality, and if […] there is no other good argument for such a conclusion, 
then these experiences include in their content beliefs that are probably false 
and in any case unjustified. This, it seems, must be scored as a disvalue against 
them” (1983, 186).
In these quotes, Mackie seems to make the following assumptions:
(A1) Theistic belief has justification or warrant only if there is a successful 
argument (deductive, inductive, or abductive) for the existence of God.
(A2) Theistic belief has justification or warrant by way of religious experience 
only if there is a successful theistic argument from religious experience.4
But why does he think that assumptions (A1) and (A2) are true? Mack-
ie makes these assumptions because he thinks that theistic belief is just 
like a scientific hypothesis (i.e. a theory designed to explain some body of 
evidence). Furthermore, he assumes that rational acceptability of theistic 
belief (like any scientific hypothesis) depends upon its success as a hy-
4 A successful theistic argument from religious experience is a good (noncircular) ar-
gument from premises reporting the occurrence of such religious experiences to the 
conclusion that God exists. And such an argument would have to include as a prem-
ise the proposition that the existence of God is the best explanation of religious 
experiences.
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pothesis.5 So, in this view, a hypothesis is acceptable to the extent that it 
succeeds in explaining the evidence. And is the theistic belief a good hy-
pothesis? Speaking about religious experience, Mackie holds that:
(Q3) “Religious experience is also essentially incapable of supporting any argu-
ment for the traditional central doctrines of theism. Nothing in an experience 
as such could reveal a creator of the world, or omnipotence, or omniscience, 
or perfect goodness, or eternity, or even that there is just one god” (1983, 182).
(Q4) “Here, as elsewhere, the supernaturalist hypothesis fails because there is 
an adequate and much more economical naturalistic alternative” (1983, 198). 
For that reason, Mackie says that “In the end, therefore, we can agree with 
what Laplace said about God: we have no need of that hypothesis” (1983, 253).
Bearing all these passages in mind, I think that a possible formulation of 
Mackie’s argument would be as follows:
(1) Theistic belief is just like a scientific hypothesis, designed to explain reli-
gious experience (among other things).
(2) If theistic belief is just like a scientific hypothesis, then (like any other 
scientific hypothesis) theistic belief has warrant by way of religious experi-
ence only if some theistic argument (from religious experience or similar) is 
successful.
(3) ∴ So, theistic belief has warrant by way of religious experience only if some 
theistic argument (from religious experience or other) is successful. [From 
1 and 2]
(4) But there isn’t any successful theistic argument (from religious experience 
or similar).
(5) ∴ Therefore, theistic belief has no warrant by way of religious experience. 
[From 3 and 4]
Is this a good argument? There are ways to object to it. One such way is 
to challenge premise (4). For example, Swinburne (2004, ch. 13) tries to 
5 This idea is also shared by Wilson (1978, 201) and Dawkins (1995, 46–47).
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provide a good theistic argument from religious experience in order to 
show the rationality of theistic belief. However, he seems to accept both of 
Mackie’s assumptions, (A1) and (A2), and, for that reason, he also seems 
to assent to thesis (T). Another way to reply to Mackie’s argument, while 
rejecting his assumptions, is to deny conclusion (3) and premise (1). This 
way of replying was essayed by Plantinga. Since this last objection criticizes 
the assumptions which are related with thesis (T), it is worth analyzing it in 
detail. So, why does Plantinga think that steps (1) and (3) are false?
We have seen that conclusion (3) of Mackie’s argument is true only if 
we think of theistic belief just as a scientific hypothesis: namely, (i) a theo-
ry designed to explain some body of evidence and (ii) acceptable to the de-
gree that it succeeds in explaining the evidence. But why think that theistic 
belief or theism is just like a scientific hypothesis? Plantinga argues that 
we don’t think the same about belief in other minds, the past, the existence 
of the external world, etc. – such beliefs are not thought of as a scientific 
hypothesis (at least they need not be considered just like scientific hypoth-
eses). So, why couldn’t the same hold for theistic belief? Why think that 
theistic belief is substantially different from our common beliefs? Mackie 
did not show it.
By reductio ad absurdum, Plantinga (2000, 92, 330; 2015, 83) argues 
that if Mackie is correct, we can also think that our beliefs about the past 
are just like scientific hypotheses. And if such beliefs are just like scientific 
hypotheses, then they are designed only to explain present phenomena 
such as our memories. If this is so, and if there were a more «economical» 
explanation of these phenomena that did not postulate past facts, then our 
usual beliefs in the past would have no warrant or justification. However, 
this seems silly; because the availability of such an “explanation” wouldn’t 
in any way tell against our ordinary belief that there has really been a past. 
Furthermore, usually we don’t accept beliefs about the past as hypothe-
ses to explain present experience or phenomena. Therefore, it seems that 
Mackie is not correct.
In other words: if Mackie’s argument is sound, we can also think that 
our common beliefs are just like scientific hypotheses. And if we think 
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that common beliefs should be just like scientific hypotheses, then many 
reasonable beliefs, such as those about other minds, the past, material 
object, perceptual beliefs, external world, etc., turn out to be unjustified 
or unwarranted (because commonly we accept those beliefs without argu-
ments and not for explanatory purposes). But such a conclusion is absurd. 
Thus, we do not need to think of those beliefs (including theistic belief) as 
similar to scientific hypotheses.
Plantinga, thus, argues that conclusion (3) of Mackie’s argument is 
unestablished, because premise (1) is false. This is because theistic belief 
is not, or at least need not be considered to be, just like a scientific hy-
pothesis, but is more similar to our perceptual beliefs or the belief in other 
minds, the past, material objects, external world, etc. And these beliefs 
can be justified or warranted even if there isn’t a good argument for them. 
Commonly we accept these beliefs in a basic way and without arguments. 
So, Mackie’s argument is not a good reason for thinking that theistic belief 
is warranted or justified only if there is a successful theistic argument.
I think Plantinga is right to deny premise (1). We can add other argu-
ments in order to show that theist belief need not be considered as a sci-
entific hypothesis. For many believers in God, the primary aim of theistic 
belief or faith is not to explain or predict natural events in the world; so, 
these people do not consider typically their faith just like a scientific hy-
pothesis postulated to explain observable events. Instead, for such people, 
theistic belief or faith is concerned with trust and love to a person: God6. 
It seems more an expression of an experience of encounter rather than an 
inferential hypothesis. If this is correct, theistic belief is more like belief in 
other people than belief in the existence of electrons or genes.
In this regard, we can make an analogy: I believe that my wife Vera 
loves me. I do not consider this belief a hypothesis; but if such belief were 
for me just like a scientific hypothesis, it would be too weird (something 
would not be right with our relationship). Plausibly something similar 
happens to believers in God. Nonetheless, even if I do not think my belief 
6 In this sense, faith not only has a propositional content, but also has an affective 
component.
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that my wife loves me as a hypothesis, occasionally someone else could 
consider such belief as a hypothesis. Suppose that my friend Joseph heard 
me say that my wife loves me. He doubts whether that belief is true and, 
for that reason, treats my belief as a hypothesis, trying to gather proofs for 
and against it. There is nothing wrong with such behavior. Likewise, some 
unbeliever could think of theistic belief as a hypothesis, trying to collect 
arguments for and against the existence of God. Once again, neither is 
there anything wrong with such behavior here; but this is not to defend 
Mackie’s thesis that theistic belief can only be like a scientific hypothesis 
for any given person. Even if someone treats my belief that my wife loves 
me as a hypothesis, I do not need to think such belief as a hypothesis. 
Likewise, generally believers in God do not need to think theistic belief as 
a hypothesis, even though someone else may do it.
2. Plantinga’s argument for (~T)
In the previous section we saw that thesis (T) does not seem very well 
grounded, since we do not need to think theistic belief as a scientific hy-
pothesis. Now we need to ascertain whether thesis (~T) fares any better. Ac-
cording to thesis (~T), it is entirely possible that theistic belief has warrant 
even if there is no good theistic argument (from religious experience or 
similar), even if such belief is not based on proofs or arguments.7 In other 
words, theistic belief can be properly basic. But how is that possible? How 
can belief in God be properly basic? Following Plantinga’s reasoning, we 
must first enquire what the warrant is. So, what is that which fills the gap 
between mere true belief and knowledge? According to Plantinga, there are 
three main views as to the nature of warrant:
7 This thesis should not be confused with fideism (such as advocated by Pascal, William 
James, Kierkegaard, or Wittgenstein) in which theistic belief can be at most pruden-
tially justified, but not epistemically justified, nor requiring any evidence. On the 
contrary, thesis (~T) holds that theistic belief can be epistemically justified, requires 
evidence (namely, non-propositional evidence, such as experiences [cf.  Plantinga 
1993b, 185–193; 2008, 164–165]), and can have the status of knowledge.
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(W1) Deontologism =df a belief p has warrant for S iff believing p is an especially 
good way for S to fulfill his epistemic duty.
(W2) Coherentism =df a belief p has warrant for S iff p is coherent with noetic 
structure of S.
(W3) Reliabilism =df a belief p has warrant for S iff p is produced in S by a pro-
cess that reliably leads to true beliefs.
The views (W1) and (W2) are internalist, whereas (W3) is externalist. On 
the one hand, “internalism” is the view that each of the conditions which 
are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for warrant is an internal 
condition, of which the subject is or may be aware. On the other hand, “ex-
ternalism” is the view that at least one of the conditions which are individ-
ually necessary and jointly sufficient for warrant is an external condition.8 
Plantinga (1993a) argues that none of these three views are really viable. 
This is because there are some counterexamples to the necessary and suf-
ficient conditions proposed by theories (W1) and (W2), and against the 
sufficient condition proposed by (W3). In short, “these views are subject 
to counterexamples in which a true belief fulfills all of the specified con-
ditions for warrant and, yet, manages to fulfill them «merely by accident»” 
(2012, 127). In order to overcome these counterexamples, Plantinga holds 
that an adequate analysis of warrant must involve the notion of “proper 
function.” As such, Plantinga (1993b; 2012) thinks that the best theory of 
warrant is “proper functionalism” which can be defined as follows:
Proper functionalism (PF) =df a belief p has warrant for a person S iff
9
(1) p is produced in S by cognitive faculties functioning properly (subject to no 
dysfunction). [The proper function condition]10
8 Here I am following the definitions of Plantinga (1993a, 5–6, 183) and Bergmann 
(402).
9 In addition to these conditions, Plantinga (1993b, 7–9) holds that warrant comes in 
degrees. Thus, he claims that if both p and p* have warrant for S, p has more warrant 
than p* for S iff S believes p more firmly than p*.
10 Plantinga (1993b, 9–10, 26–30) holds that a cognitive equipment functioning “prop-
erly” is not the same thing as it functioning “normally” (in a statistical sense), or 
functioning “perfectly” or even “ideally”. Instead, a cognitive equipment is function-
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(2) p is formed in an appropriate epistemic environment (one sufficiently sim-
ilar to that for which S’s cognitive faculties were designed). [The environmental 
condition]
(3) S’s cognitive faculties, which produce p, are operating according to a de-
sign plan reliably aimed at truth (rather than some other cognitive goal). [The 
reliability condition]
(4) S has no defeaters for p. [The no-defeater condition]
Now, if proper functionalism (or some other similar externalist theory) 
about warrant is correct, can theistic belief have warrant? Can theistic belief 
be properly basic? In order to answer affirmatively, Plantinga proposes 
a model in which theistic belief is basic and warranted. This model is labe-
led “Aquinas/Calvin model” or “A/C model”, because it is based on claims 
made by Thomas Aquinas and John Calvin. According to Plantinga, “to give 
a model of a proposition or state of affairs S is to show how it could be that 
S is true or actual” (2000, 168). Furthermore, the model itself is another 
proposition or state of affairs S*, such that (1) S* is logically and epistemi-
cally possible and (2) if S* is true, then S is true. From (1) and (2), it follows 
that S is logically and epistemically possible. And a model S* is epistemi-
cally possible just in case S* is consistent with what we know, where “what 
we know” is what all (or most) of the participants in the discussion agree 
on (cf. Plantinga 2000, 169; 2015, 31).
So, in giving the A/C model, Plantinga wants to show that: (1) the A/C 
model is possible [in a logical and epistemic sense] and (2) if the A/C model 
is true, then it is true that theistic belief has warrant in a basic way. From 
that, it follows that it is possible that theistic belief has warrant in a basic 
way (i.e., without inferences or arguments). In other words, it follows that 
ing properly (i) when it works in accord with its design plan (in other words, when it 
works just the way in which it was designed to work) and (ii) when it works in such 
a way as to fulfill its purpose or function (i.e. when it does what it was designed to 
do). By “design plan” Plantinga means a set of specifications according to which 
a thing (artifact, organism, or faculty) is supposed to work. And this design plan can 
be the result of conscious design (like God) or simply of unconscious design (like 
natural evolution).
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thesis (~T) is true. Since, according to the possible state of affairs described 
in the A/C model, theistic belief has warrant in a basic way, if that state 
of affairs is actual, then theistic belief has indeed warrant in a basic way. 
Moreover, if God exists, then very likely the A/C model (or something sim-
ilar) is also true. Therefore, if God exists, then very likely the theistic belief 
has warrant in a basic way.
However, Plantinga doesn’t want to prove that God exists or to show 
that the A/C model is true or actual11. Instead, Plantinga merely wants to 
argue that (1) the A/C model is epistemically possible and, for that reason, 
theistic belief can be warranted in a basic way [i.e., he wants to show that 
thesis (~T) is true]; and (2) if God exists, likely theistic belief is warranted 
in a basic way. More rigorously, I think that we can formulate Plantinga’s 
argument as follows (where “M” is “the A/C model is true or actual”, “G” is 
“the theistic God exists”, “A” is “there are successful theistic arguments”, 
and “W” is “the theistic belief is warranted”):
First part of Plantinga’s argument:12
(1) ◊M
(2) □(M→¬(W→A))
(3) ∴ ◊(W∧¬A) [from 1 and 2]
Second part of Plantinga’s argument:13
(4) □(G→M)
(5) ∴ □(G→W) [from 2 and 4]
11 Plantinga (2000, 170, 201, 499) seems really skeptical of natural theology; for ex-
ample, he claims that no argument with premises accepted by everyone or nearly 
everyone is strong enough to support theistic or Christian belief. But I suspect that 
this criterion of success for an argument is quite unreasonable; for instance, if we 
use this criterion, then the argumentation for (~T) is unsuccessful.
12 For a similar formulation of the first part of the argument see MacIntosh (2000). The 
argument is valid in K, the weakest system of modal logic; and if it is valid in K, then 
it is also valid in all the other ones.
13 In more rigorous terms, Plantinga seems to present that argument in a probabilistic 
way and not in a deductive way. So, perhaps a more precise way to formulate the sec-
ond part of Plantinga’s argument is as follow: (4) P(M|G) is high. (5) ∴ P(W|G) is high.
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In this argument, on the one hand, conclusion (3) is the negation of (T) 
and the affirmation of (~T). In other words, it is a reply to Mackie’s thesis. 
On the other hand, conclusion (5) is a reply to the following de jure objec-
tion14: theistic belief, whether true or false, has no warrant (in a basic way); 
in other words, even if theistic belief is true, very likely it isn’t warranted. 
However, if (5) is true, then no de jure objection is compatible with the truth 
of the theistic belief; i.e., there aren’t any viable de jure criticisms that are 
compatible with the truth of the theistic belief.
This is a general formulation of Plantinga’s argument. Now, we need 
to grasp some details of this argument. For example, in what consists the 
A/C model?15 How is the A/C model described? Plantinga asserts that the 
A/C model is based on the assumption that we are God’s creation, cre-
ated in God’s image, and on the claim made by Aquinas and Calvin that 
“there is a kind of natural knowledge of God” (2000, 170). For instance, 
according to Aquinas, “to know in a general and confused way that God 
exists is implanted in us by nature” (Summa Theologiae I, q. 2, a. 1, ad. 1), 
and according to Calvin, “there is within the human mind, and indeed by 
natural instinct, an awareness of divinity. […] God himself has implanted 
in all men a certain understanding of his divine majesty” (Institutes of the 
Christian Religion I, iii, 1).
So, on the basis of such assumptions,16 there is a natural human ten-
dency, a sort of instinct, to form beliefs about God under a variety of con-
ditions and circumstances. In other words, there is a faculty or a cognitive 
mechanism, what Calvin describes as sensus divinitatis, a sense of divinity 
(hereafter SD), which in a wide variety of circumstances produces beliefs 
about God in human beings.
According to Plantinga, “the sensus divinitatis is a disposition or set of 
dispositions to form theistic beliefs in various circumstances, in response 
14 A de jure objection to theistic belief is the claim that such belief is unjustified or 
unwarranted; a common de jure objection holds that ◊(G∧¬W). 
15 Plantinga also develops an “extended A/C model” in which Christian beliefs can have 
warrant. But, for our purposes and since we are considering theistic belief, we just 
need to focus on “the A/C model”.
16 These ideas were already present in Paul’s letter to the Romans (cf. Rom 1, 18–20).
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to the sorts of conditions or stimuli that trigger the working of this sense 
of divinity” (2000, 173). Moreover, it “is part of our original cognitive equip-
ment, part of the fundamental epistemic establishment with which we have 
been created by God” (2000, 180). We can describe (cf. Miller 2005, 148) 
more rigorously the SD as follows:
(DSD) a person S forms a theistic belief as a result of the working of S’s SD at 
time t if (and only if):
(i) S’s cognitive faculties at t include a SD (or similar);
(ii) S at t is in specific circumstances C which trigger SD;
(iii) S’s SD at t is functioning properly.17
But what are these circumstances C? It is hard to give a rigorous character-
ization, but they might include common religious experiences, like praying, 
reading the Bible, attending Mass, feeling guilt or gratitude, experiencing 
danger, or simply contemplating the beauty of nature, and so on, in which 
one may sense God’s presence or something akin to that. Such circum-
stances C can trigger SD and, if SD is working properly, theistic belief is 
formed. Using an analogy, we can hold that SD is like an input-output de-
vice: it takes the circumstances C as input and issues as output theistic 
belief, if it is functioning properly.
However, on the A/C model, it is not the case that every person has 
theistic beliefs as a result of the operation of the SD. As with the other 
cognitive faculties, the SD of some people may be operating in an inappro-
priate environment and, for that reason, condition (ii) of (DSD) is not satis-
fied. Or the SD of certain persons may be operating with some dysfunction 
and, so, condition (iii) of (DSD) is not satisfied. For example, according 
to the A/C model and if Christian history is true, original sin can damage 
17 I am inclined to add a further condition which I think is crucial, although Plantinga 
makes no reference to it. This further condition is the free-will condition to accept or 
to reject the belief in God, and which can also explain the variability of belief in God 
or the unbelief (cf. Beilby 2007, 156–158). So, it might be relevant to add that: (iv) S 
freely accepts or is willing to accept what is produced by SD at t.
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the sensus divinitatis and compromises its operation (Plantinga 2000, 184; 
2015: 37). Other explanations for unbelief are given, for example, by Moser 
(2008), Greco (2008), Stump (2010), and Bergmann (2012).
Nevertheless, if all conditions of (DSD) are met, theistic belief is likely 
basic for the believer. In the same way that, in typical cases, human beings 
find themselves with perceptual and memory beliefs, in the absence of any 
inferences or arguments for such beliefs, so also theistic belief is typically 
formed in a direct or basic way in human beings who are in circumstanc-
es C, like circumstances of religious experience. In this regard Plantinga 
claims that:
(Q5) “According to the A/C model, this natural knowledge of God is not arrived 
at by inference or argument (for example, the famous theistic proofs of nat-
ural theology) but in a much more immediate way. […] These beliefs [about 
God] just arise within us. They are occasioned by the circumstances; they are 
not conclusions from them. […] In this regard, the sensus divinitatis resembles 
perception, memory, and a priori belief” (2000, 175).
Thus, theistic belief is not acquired by way of inferences or arguments, but 
in a basic or immediate way. In other words, theistic belief produced by SD 
is not the conclusion of an argument, nor are the various circumstances 
C (that trigger the operation of the SD) premises for an argument. On the 
contrary, this is a belief that spontaneously arises in those circumstances 
C, in a similar way to perceptive or memory beliefs.18 Therefore, according 
to a foundationalist epistemology, we can say that theistic belief is a basic 
belief, because this belief is not accepted on the basis of any arguments 
18 Here Plantinga seems to hold a “parity thesis” in which beliefs which result from the 
operations of S’s SD can play roughly the same foundational role in S as do those 
which result from S’s cognitive faculties responsible for perception, memory, and 
a priori belief (cf. Miller 2005, 149). However, Plantinga does not hold that theistic 
belief is identical, in a phenomenological sense, to perceptual or memory beliefs. 
Instead, he only claims that what these beliefs share in common is the following: 
(i) they can be formed by cognitive faculties functioning properly in an appropriate 
environment; (ii) they can be both warranted in a basic way. But, other proponents 
of thesis (~T), like Alston (1991), seem to go further holding that the warrant of the-
istic belief is indeed perceptual warrant.
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or inferences, it is not accepted on the evidencial basis of other beliefs or 
propositions.
Furthermore, on the A/C model and if all conditions of (DSD) are met, 
the theistic belief is not only basic but also properly basic, because it meets 
the conditions for warrant (Plantinga 2000, 179; 2015, 36-37), namely: 
the SD has been designed by God so that if it is functioning properly and 
under an appropriate epistemic environment (as the circumstances C), it 
produces true basic beliefs about God. In other words, a theistic belief p has 
warrant for a person S, because p is produced in S by SD that it is properly 
functioning, in circumstances C, according to a design plan, conceived by 
God, reliably aimed at truth. So, when the SD works in a proper way and 
under proper circumstances commonly it produces true theistic beliefs. 
Therefore, theistic belief produced by the SD can be properly basic with 
respect to warrant.
Now, given that the A/C model seems to be consistent, it shows how 
theistic belief can be warranted without any good theistic argument; it 
indicates the possibility of theistic belief being warranted in a basic way. 
Thus, what we have seen so far was that once the A/C model is possible, it 
follows that it is possible that theistic belief is warranted in a basic way, 
i.e., thesis (~T) is true. But, is the A/C model true or actual? Is theistic belief 
indeed warranted in a basic way? The answer is affirmative if theistic belief 
is true and, so, if God exists. Hence, if God exists, then the A/C model (or 
a similar one) is likely true and, for that reason, there is a cognitive faculty, 
like the SD, that produces theistic beliefs which are warranted in a basic 
way. Quoting Plantinga,
(Q6) If theistic belief is true, “then there is, indeed, such a person as God, 
a person who has created us in his image […], who loves us, who desires that 
we know and love him […]. But if these things are so, then he would of course 
intend that we be able to be aware of his presence and to know something 
about him. […] Given that God would certainly want us to be able to know him, 
the chances are excellent that he would create us with faculties enabling us to 
do just that” (2000, 188–189).
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So, if theistic belief is true, then likely the A/C model (or similar) is true 
and, thus, likely theistic belief is warranted. However, what if theistic belief 
is false or if God doesn’t exist? If God doesn’t exist, likely theistic belief 
isn’t warranted; because there isn’t a SD and so on. Therefore, theistic 
basic belief has externalistic warrant (likely) if, and only if, there is God. In 
a general way I am inclined to consider that this line of argument for (~T) 
likely is correct, if epistemic externalism (like proper functionalism the-
ory) is true. But even if this argumentation is correct, I think (contrary to 
Plantinga) that theistic arguments are necessary for some purposes. Thus, 
working on natural theology or on natural atheology is unavoidable.19
3. The role of theistic arguments even if thesis (~T) is true
Plantinga’s project is to explain how theistic beliefs can be warranted and 
properly basic, as opposed to showing that they are so. In other words, 
Plantinga’s project is to hold that (1) it is possible that theistic belief is 
warranted even if there isn’t any good theistic argument, i.e., thesis (~T); 
and (2) if there is a God, likely theistic belief has warrant.
I think that this project, if successful, is sufficient to deny Mackie’s 
thesis (T), but at the same time it seems to me an insufficient project. 
There are relevant questions, like: Is the A/C model true or actual? Is the-
istic belief indeed warranted? To answer such problems, it is not enough 
to hold that “if God exists, then theistic belief is warranted”. Additionally, 
from this conditional, it should be assessed whether we can apply or not 
modus ponens. That is, we need to work on arguments for and against God’s 
existence. So, I think that the crucial question is to try to show that the A/C 
model (or similar) is indeed actual and, for that reason, it is necessary to 
show that God exists in order to convince other people that theistic belief 
has warrant. Thus, we are still in need of natural (a)theology. In this regard, 
I agree with Swinburne, Fales, and Sennett:
19 By “natural theology” I mean the attempts to show successfully that God exists and 
by “natural atheology” I mean the attempts to show successfully that God does not 
exist.
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(Q7) “There is, however, a monumental issue which Plantinga does not discuss, 
and which a lot of people will consider needs discussing. This is whether Chris-
tian [or theistic] beliefs do have warrant (in Plantinga’s sense). He has shown 
that they do, if they are true; so we might hope for discussion of whether they 
are true” (Swinburne 2001: 206).
(Q8) “Perhaps God has implanted within me a [sensus divinitatis] by the light of 
which I could come to know Him. […] But how can I know whether this is so? 
How can Plantinga know it? Is Plantinga’s «model» of our cognitive constitu-
tion correct, or merely a just-so story?” (Fales 2003, 358).
(Q9) “While good [propositional] evidence is not required for basic theistic be-
lief to be rational or warranted, good [propositional] evidence may be required 
in order for it to be shown that basic theistic belief is rational or warranted. 
The theist requires no [propositional] evidence for the epistemic pedigree of 
her own basic theistic belief. But if she wishes to convince anyone else that her 
basic theistic belief is proper, she (or at any rate, someone) must have [propo-
sitional] evidence” (Sennett 2003, 230).
By accepting Plantinga’s argument for (~T), we agree that theistic belief can 
be warranted in a basic way and, for that reason, the believers in God need 
not be aware of any arguments for God’s existence in order for their beliefs 
to be warranted. But, for the purpose of showing that the believer’s belief 
is indeed warranted in a basic way, Plantinga or other epistemologist in the 
theistic community must be aware of good theistic arguments. Thus, even 
if we grant that Plantinga’s argument for (~T) is successful, it seems that 
the conclusion of that argument is insufficient. This is because it appears 
relevant, at least for the epistemologist, to know whether the A/C model 
is actual or just merely possible, whether theistic belief is indeed warrant-
ed in a basic way or not for some people. For such purposes, as well as to 
convince people outside the theistic community (like skeptics or atheists) 
that theistic belief is warranted, it is required to work out arguments for 
and against the existence of God.
This point of mine may be further strengthened when considering oth-
er aspects. A widespread objection to Plantinga’s religious epistemology 
tries to hold that Plantinga’s argument for thesis (~T) can be easily adapted 
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and imitated to defend that (i) it is possible that other religious beliefs, 
as well as other bizarre beliefs (like beliefs in the voodoo or in the Great 
Pumpkin20), are warranted in a basic way, and that (ii) such beliefs likely 
have warrant if they are true. Thus, this objection, which is known as “the 
Great Pumpkin objection”21, seeks to show that weird or bizarre beliefs 
can be defended in a similar way as Plantinga defends theistic belief. So, 
Plantinga’s argument opens the door to a Pandora’s Box in which strange 
beliefs can be warranted, and in which a diversity of non-theistic religious 
beliefs (which are contradictory with theistic beliefs) can be warranted. 
However, if Plantinga’s project can be so imitated or adapted, allowing for 
the possibility of contradictory religious beliefs being warranted and for 
the possibility of clearly irrational beliefs being warranted, it seems that 
there is some problem with it. There are several possible formulations of 
this objection; my own proposal is this:
(1) If theistic belief is intellectually acceptable from the point of view of neutral 
observers22 because such belief is both possible and warranted-if-true, then 
a bizarre belief, e.g. a Great Pumpkin belief, is also intellectually acceptable 
from the point of view of neutral observers because such belief is both possible 
and warranted-if-true.
(2) But, a bizarre belief is not intellectually acceptable from the point of view 
of neutral observers.
(3) ∴ Therefore, theistic belief is not intellectually acceptable from the point of 
view of neutral observers. [From 1 and 2]
Now, if conclusion (3) is true, then one of the main objectives of Plantinga 
(2000: vii) ultimately fails, because it seems that he wanted to show that 
theistic belief can be considered as intellectually acceptable not only for 
20 This is a reference to a Charlie Brown episode in which Linus believes mistakenly 
that the Great Pumpkin returns every Halloween to give gifts to all the kids.
21 There are various different versions of this objection: Martin (1990), DeRose (1999), 
Zagzebski (2002), Wunder (2007), Scott (2014).
22 By “neutral observers” I mean rational observers outside the community in issue 
and who do not share such beliefs (like theistic belief, Great Pumpkin belief, voodoo 
belief, etc).
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those inside the community of believers, but also for those outside the 
community of believers (like agnostics, atheists, or neutral observers) or 
more generally, like Plantinga said, “for educated and intelligent people 
living in the twenty-first century” (idem). But if this version of the Great 
Pumpkin objection is correct, from a public point of view there is no reason 
to think that theistic belief is indeed intellectually acceptable (contrary to 
what Plantinga thinks). Let’s see how we can justify this objection.
Starting with the justification of premise (1), we can suppose that Linus 
has always believed in the existence of the Great Pumpkin that returns 
every Halloween and he has such a belief without any inference or argu-
ments. Furthermore, let’s presume that he has no defeater for that belief, 
and even if he has acquired a defeater (for instance, when the Great Pump-
kin fails to return every Halloween), he is able to defeat that defeater (for 
example, conceiving a defense of the Great Pumpkin).
In order to explain how Linus’s belief can be warranted in a basic way, 
one can build a Great Pumpkin model (hereafter “GP model”) in all epis-
temic aspects similar to the A/C model and in which the Great Pumpkin 
belief is properly basic. According to the GP model, there is a cognitive fac-
ulty, a sensus cucurbitae, i.e. a pumpkin sense, which was implanted in some 
chosen and predestined human beings, like Linus, by the Great Pumpkin. 
When that sensus cucurbitae is working properly, in proper circumstances 
(like experiences of Halloween), the belief in the existence of the Great 
Pumpkin is produced in a direct or immediate way with warrant. Thus, on 
the GP model, the belief in the existence of the Great Pumpkin is produced 
by cognitive faculties, the sensus cucurbitae, according to a design plan, 
conceived by the Great Pumpkin, reliably aimed at true. That is, on the GP 
model, Linus is warranted in believing the Great Pumpkin.
Similarly to what was said about the A/C model, we can add that the GP 
model is logically possible and that, at least, it is epistemically possible for 
Linus. Moreover, if there is the Great Pumpkin, it seems likely that the GP 
model is true and, for that reason, this belief in the existence of the Great 
Pumpkin is warranted. So, the Great Pumpkin belief is warranted if it is 
true. Now, if it makes sense that theistic belief is intellectually acceptable 
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from a public point of view because there is an A/C model and a specif-
ic belief that is possible and warranted-if-true, then it also makes sense 
that the Great Pumpkin belief is intellectually acceptable because there 
is a GP model and a specific belief that is possible and warranted-if-true. 
I think that we can build similar models for the voodoo belief, or for other 
bizarre beliefs. However, justifying premise (2), we need to ask: Is Linus’s 
belief intellectually acceptable from the point of view of neutral observers? 
Is a bizarre or weird belief in general intellectually acceptable? Intuitively 
I think not, because it seems to me that there is something wrong with the 
bizarre or strange beliefs and their origins, for example: they seem to be, 
by default and for most rational people, merely a just-so story.
But in that case Plantinga’s project to defend the intellectual accepta-
bility of theistic belief is not relevantly different, in an epistemic sense, 
from a strategy one could use to defend bizarre beliefs which are intellec-
tually unacceptable. From the point of view of neutral observers there is 
no relevant difference between Plantinga’s project and any other project to 
defend unacceptable and bizarre beliefs. These neutral observers, accepting 
Plantinga’s project as well as the imitations of such project, cannot grasp 
any significant epistemic difference between the theistic belief and the 
Great Pumpkin belief or other bizarre beliefs. For that reason, if bizarre 
beliefs, like the Great Pumpkin belief, are not intellectually acceptable for 
neutral observers, it follows that theistic beliefs are also not intellectually 
acceptable for neutral observers. Hence, such neutral observers do not have 
a good reason to consider theistic belief as intellectually acceptable.
From conclusion (3) it does not follow that theistic belief cannot be 
warranted or that theistic belief is not intellectually acceptable from the 
point of view of believers in God. So, we may continue to hold that be-
lievers in God can have warrant in a basic way, i.e. we may continue to 
claim that thesis (~T) is true. Instead, what follows from my version of the 
Great Pumpkin objection is that neutral observers do not have any reason 
to accept the intellectual acceptability of theistic belief in the same way 
that they have no reason to accept the intellectual acceptability of bizarre 
beliefs. Thus, Plantinga’s project offers no reason why neutral observers 
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should take theistic belief more seriously than the Great Pumpkin belief, 
voodoo belief, or any other bizarre belief. But if this is so, then something 
seems to be wrong with Plantinga’s project.
I think that the best way to cope with this objection is to formulate 
good arguments for God’s existence, showing that the A/C model is not 
only possible but also actual, and arguing that the GP model or the Great 
Pumpkin is at most merely possible. So, an argument must be provided in 
order for neutral observers to take seriously that the A/C model is likely 
true and that the same does not apply to the GP model. If this is correct, 
then we are still significantly in need of a natural theology, of work on ar-
guments for and against God’s existence. Thus, I claim that what is wrong 
with Plantinga’s project is not some internal fail on the A/C model, but that 
it is simply incomplete; namely it is unfinished work to argue that theistic 
belief is possible or warranted-if-true, without arguing for the truth of such 
belief, in order to establish the acceptability of rational belief from a public 
point of view.
In short, my thesis is that theistic belief plausibly can be warranted 
without any theistic argument, but having good theistic arguments is nec-
essary for some purposes, such as the following: to show that the A/C model 
is true or actual; to confirm that theistic belief is indeed warranted for 
some people; to convince those outside of theistic community that theistic 
belief is rational or warranted; to cope with the Great Pumpkin objection, 
and so on.23 To achieve these purposes, it is not enough to work on nega-
tive apologetics, like Plantinga, arguing that the problem from evil or the 
problem of divine hiddenness are not good defeaters or reasons to give 
up theistic belief. Rather, it is also necessary to try to offer some positive 
apologetic for such theistic belief, formulating good arguments for God’s 
existence.
Perhaps one can resist my thesis, holding that the arguments for God’s 
existence are not necessary for these purposes, and instead that all that is 
needed is to invite people (like skeptics, agnostics, or others outside the 
23 We could also argue that natural theology is necessary because of problems of reli-
gious diversity, or to prevent the existence of some defeaters for theistic belief, etc.
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theistic community) to participate in appropriate circumstances C (like 
the circumstances of praying, reading the Bible, etc). However, it seems 
that such strategy may not work. On the one hand, even if such people find 
themselves in circumstances C, it does not follow that they will form war-
ranted theistic beliefs; for example, in situations in which there is no God, 
or in which the sensus divinitatis is malfunctioning, etc. On the other hand, 
that strategy can be imitated by other religions or still by communities 
which hold bizarre beliefs. Thus, to avoid falling in such problems, I think 
that the best way to fulfill those purposes is by working on arguments for 
and against God’s existence.
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